Despite President Barack Obama ’ s recent call to reduce the United States ’ reliance on drones , they will likely remain his administration ’ s weapon of choice . Whereas President George W . Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure , Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years , making the program the centerpiece of U . S . counterterrorism strategy . The drones have done their job remarkably well : by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan , Yemen , and , to a lesser degree , Somalia , drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti - American militant groups . And they have done so at little financial cost , at no risk to U . S . forces , and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused . Critics , however , remain skeptical . They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians , alienate allied governments , anger foreign publics , illegally target Americans , and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse . Some of these criticisms are valid ; others , less so . In the end , drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism . The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere , and drones offer a comparatively low - risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage . So drone warfare is here to stay , and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries ’ capabilities catch up with those of the United States . But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy , spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U . S . drone program to justify attacks against political opponents . At the same time , even as it solidifies the drone program , Washington must remain mindful of the built - in limits of low - cost , unmanned interventions , since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid . NOBODY DOES IT BETTER The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason : they work . According to data compiled by the New America Foundation , since Obama has been in the White House , U . S . drones have killed an estimated 3 , 300 al Qaeda , Taliban , and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen . That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban — top figures who are not easily replaced . In 2010 , Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide , Atiyah Abd al - Rahman , who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011 , that when experienced leaders are eliminated , the result is “ the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders ” and who are prone to errors and miscalculations . And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills : passport forgers , bomb makers , recruiters , and fundraisers . Drones have also undercut terrorists ’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits . In order to avoid attracting drones , al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers . A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to “ maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts ” and “ avoid gathering in open areas . ” Leaders , however , cannot give orders when they are incommunicado , and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits . Drones have turned al Qaeda ’ s command and training structures into a liability , forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders . Critics of drone strikes often fail to take into account the fact that the alternatives are either too risky or unrealistic . To be sure , in an ideal world , militants would be captured alive , allowing authorities to question them and search their compounds for useful information . Raids , arrests , and interrogations can produce vital intelligence and can be less controversial than lethal operations . That is why they should be , and indeed already are , used in stable countries where the United States enjoys the support of the host government . But in war zones or unstable countries , such as Pakistan , Yemen , and Somalia , arresting militants is highly dangerous and , even if successful , often inefficient . In those three countries , the government exerts little or no control over remote areas , which means that it is highly dangerous to go after militants hiding out there . Worse yet , in Pakistan and Yemen , the governments have at times cooperated with militants . If the United States regularly sent in special operations forces to hunt down terrorists there , sympathetic officials could easily tip off the jihadists , likely leading to firefights , U . S . casualties , and possibly the deaths of the suspects and innocent civilians . Of course , it was a Navy SEAL team and not a drone strike that finally got bin Laden , but in many cases in which the United States needs to capture or eliminate an enemy , raids are too risky and costly . And even if a raid results in a successful capture , it begets another problem : what to do with the detainee . Prosecuting detainees in a federal or military court is difficult because often the intelligence against terrorists is inadmissible or using it risks jeopardizing sources and methods . And given the fact that the United States is trying to close , rather than expand , the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay , Cuba , it has become much harder to justify holding suspects indefinitely . It has become more politically palatable for the United States to kill rather than detain suspected terrorists . Furthermore , although a drone strike may violate the local state ’ s sovereignty , it does so to a lesser degree than would putting U . S . boots on the ground or conducting a large - scale air campaign . And compared with a 500 - pound bomb dropped from an F - 16 , the grenadelike warheads carried by most drones create smaller , more precise blast zones that decrease the risk of unexpected structural damage and casualties . Even more important , drones , unlike traditional airplanes , can loiter above a target for hours , waiting for the ideal moment to strike and thus reducing the odds that civilians will be caught in the kill zone . Finally , using drones is also far less bloody than asking allies to hunt down terrorists on the United States ’ behalf . The Pakistani and Yemeni militaries , for example , are known to regularly torture and execute detainees , and they often indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched - earth tactics against militant groups . Some critics of the drone program , such as Ben Emmerson , the UN ’ s special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism , have questioned the lethal approach , arguing for more focus on the factors that might contribute to extremism and terrorism , such as poverty , unemployment , and authoritarianism . Such a strategy is appealing in principle , but it is far from clear how Washington could execute it . Individuals join anti - American terrorist groups for many reasons , ranging from outrage over U . S . support for Israel to anger at their own government ’ s cooperation with the United States . Some people simply join up because their neighbors are doing so . Slashing unemployment in Yemen , bringing democracy to Saudi Arabia , and building a functioning government in Somalia are laudable goals , but they are not politically or financially possible for the United States , and even if achieved , they still might not reduce the allure of jihad . In some cases , the most sensible alternative to carrying out drone strikes is to do nothing at all . At times , that is the right option : if militants abroad pose little threat or if the risk of killing civilians , delegitimizing allies , or establishing the wrong precedent is too high . But sometimes imminent and intolerable threats do arise and drone strikes are the best way to eliminate them . THE NUMBERS GAME Despite the obvious benefits of using drones and the problems associated with the alternatives , numerous critics argue that drones still have too many disadvantages . First among them is an unacceptably high level of civilian casualties . Admittedly , drones have killed innocents . But the real debate is over how many and whether alternative approaches are any better . The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that in 2011 , drone strikes killed as many as 146 noncombatants , including as many as 9 children . Columbia Law School ’ s Human Rights Clinic also cites high numbers of civilian deaths , as does the Pakistani organization Pakistan Body Count . Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation oversees a database of drone casualties culled from U . S . sources and international media reports . He estimates that between 150 and 500 civilians have been killed by drones during Obama ’ s administration . U . S . officials , meanwhile , maintain that drone strikes have killed almost no civilians . In June 2011 , John Brennan , then Obama ’ s top counterterrorism adviser , even contended that U . S . drone strikes had killed no civilians in the previous year . But these claims are based on the fact that the U . S . government assumes that all military - age males in the blast area of a drone strike are combatants — unless it can determine after the fact that they were innocent ( and such intelligence gathering is not a priority ) . The United States has recently taken to launching “ signature strikes , ” which target not specific individuals but instead groups engaged in suspicious activities . This approach makes it even more difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians and verify body counts of each . Still , as one U . S . official told The New York Times last year , “ Al Qaeda is an insular , paranoid organization — innocent neighbors don ’ t hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border with guns and bombs . ” Of course , not everyone accepts this reasoning . Zeeshan - ul - hassan Usmani , who runs Pakistan Body Count , says that “ neither [ the United States ] nor Pakistan releases any detailed information about the victims . . . so [ although the United States ] likes to call everybody Taliban , I call everybody civilians . ” The truth is that all the public numbers are unreliable . Who constitutes a civilian is often unclear ; when trying to kill the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud , for example , the United States also killed his doctor . The doctor was not targeting U . S . or allied forces , but he was aiding a known terrorist leader . In addition , most strikes are carried out in such remote locations that it is nearly impossible for independent sources to verify who was killed . In Pakistan , for example , the overwhelming majority of drone killings occur in tribal areas that lie outside the government ’ s control and are prohibitively dangerous for Westerners and independent local journalists to enter . Thus , although the New America Foundation has come under fire for relying heavily on unverifiable information provided by anonymous U . S . officials , reports from local Pakistani organizations , and the Western organizations that rely on them , are no better : their numbers are frequently doctored by the Pakistani government or by militant groups . After a strike in Pakistan , militants often cordon off the area , remove their dead , and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a body count themselves . The U . S . media often then draw on such faulty reporting to give the illusion of having used multiple sources . As a result , statistics on civilians killed by drones are often inflated . One of the few truly independent on - the - ground reporting efforts , conducted by the Associated Press last year , concluded that the strikes “ are killing far fewer civilians than many in [ Pakistan ] are led to believe . ” But even the most unfavorable estimates of drone casualties reveal that the ratio of civilian to militant deaths — about one to three , according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism — is lower than it would be for other forms of strikes . Bombings by F - 16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos , for example , pack a much more deadly payload . In December 2009 , the United States fired Tomahawks at a suspected terrorist training camp in Yemen , and over 30 people were killed in the blast , most of them women and children . At the time , the Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones , but had this not been the case , a drone ’ s real - time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children , and the attack would have been aborted . Even if the strike had gone forward for some reason , the drone ’ s far smaller warhead would have killed fewer innocents . Civilian deaths are tragic and pose political problems . But the data show that drones are more discriminate than other types of force . FOREIGN FRIENDS It is also telling that drones have earned the backing , albeit secret , of foreign governments . In order to maintain popular support , politicians in Pakistan and Yemen routinely rail against the U . S . drone campaign . In reality , however , the governments of both countries have supported it . During the Bush and Obama administrations , Pakistan has even periodically hosted U . S . drone facilities and has been told about strikes in advance . Pervez Musharraf , president of Pakistan until 2008 , was not worried about the drone program ’ s negative publicity : “ In Pakistan , things fall out of the sky all the time , ” he reportedly remarked . Yemen ’ s former president , Ali Abdullah Saleh , also at times allowed drone strikes in his country and even covered for them by telling the public that they were conducted by the Yemeni air force . When the United States ’ involvement was leaked in 2002 , however , relations between the two countries soured . Still , Saleh later let the drone program resume in Yemen , and his replacement , Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi , has publicly praised drones , saying that “ they pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error , if you know what target you ’ re aiming at . ” As officials in both Pakistan and Yemen realize , U . S . drone strikes help their governments by targeting common enemies . A memo released by the antisecrecy website WikiLeaks revealed that Pakistan ’ s army chief , Ashfaq Parvez kayani , privately asked U . S . military leaders in 2008 for “ continuous Predator coverage ” over antigovernment militants , and the journalist Mark Mazzetti has reported that the United States has conducted “ goodwill kills ” against Pakistani militants who threatened Pakistan far more than the United States . Thus , in private , Pakistan supports the drone program . As then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told Anne Patterson , then the U . S . ambassador to Pakistan , in 2008 , “ We ’ ll protest [ against the drone program ] in the National Assembly and then ignore it . ” Still , Pakistan is reluctant to make its approval public . First of all , the country ’ s inability to fight terrorists on its own soil is a humiliation for Pakistan ’ s politically powerful armed forces and intelligence service . In addition , although drones kill some of the government ’ s enemies , they have also targeted pro - government groups that are hostile to the United States , such as the Haqqani network and the Taliban , which Pakistan has supported since its birth in the early 1990s . Even more important , the Pakistani public is vehemently opposed to U . S . drone strikes . A 2012 poll found that 74 percent of Pakistanis viewed the United States as their enemy , likely in part because of the ongoing drone campaign . Similarly , in Yemen , as the scholar Gregory Johnsen has pointed out , drone strikes can win the enmity of entire tribes . This has led critics to argue that the drone program is shortsighted : that it kills today ’ s enemies but creates tomorrow ’ s in the process . Such concerns are valid , but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed . Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti - drone organizations , which results in biased samples . Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it . In addition , many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country . And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis , the most important problems they struggle with are corruption , weak representative institutions , and poor economic growth ; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger , most of which is directed toward their own governments . A poll conducted in 2007 , well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope , found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States . It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes , such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes , would make the United States more popular . THE HOME FRONT Still , public opposition is real , and there is growing concern about the drone strikes even in the United States . The program came under especially heavy criticism domestically in 2011 , when Anwar al - Awlaki , a U . S . citizen born in New Mexico , was killed by a drone strike in Yemen . There is no question that Awlaki was dangerous . Adept at interspersing Islamist rhetoric with pop - culture references , Awlaki had been described as a “ pied piper for Western ears ” : one admirer was Nidal Malik Hasan , the U . S . Army officer who killed 13 U . S . soldiers at Fort Hood , Texas , in 2009 . The Obama administration claims that Awlaki was actively involved in plots against the United States and that the strike against him was legal under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force ( AUMF ) , which Congress passed three days after 9 / 11 and which gives the president broad authority to use force against terrorist groups linked to the 9 / 11 attacks . Yet with the war on terrorism almost 12 years old and bin Laden dead , critics , such as the Georgetown University law professor Rosa Brooks , have begun questioning whether the AUMF still justifies drone strikes today . As Brooks has argued , “ Many of the groups now being identified as threats don ’ t fall clearly under the AUMF ’ s umbrella — and many don ’ t pose a significant danger to the United States . ” As for the case of Awlaki , opponents of his killing have argued that he did not pose an imminent threat to the United States and that in keeping the evidence used to justify his assassination secret , the administration violated the constitutional guarantee of due process for U . S . citizens . As Ron Paul , then a Texas representative , pointed out during his presidential campaign , Awlaki was never charged with any crime . He added , “ If the American people accept this blindly and casually , that we now have an accepted practice of the president assassinating people who he thinks are bad guys , I think it ’ s sad . ” The administration contends that the discussions held within the executive branch and the extensive vetting of evidence constitute a form of due process . Meanwhile , as the legal scholar Benjamin Wittes has pointed out , both Congress and the federal courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the validity of the AUMF since 2001 . The U . S . government argues that given how secretly terrorists operate , it is not always possible to use other means to stop an individual overseas from planning attacks on U . S . forces or allies . As a result , the imminence of a threat should be assessed based on the individual ’ s propensity for violence and the likelihood of being able to stop him in the future . Wittes compares the decision - making process to that used in hostage situations , when police are not required to ask a judge for authority to kill a hostage taker or refrain from taking a clear shot if they have one . Perhaps most important , the White House has claimed only a very limited right to conduct drone strikes against U . S . citizens . The administration has asserted the authority to kill only senior al Qaeda leaders who cannot be captured , not any American member of al Qaeda . Indeed , it appears that Awlaki is the only U . S . citizen who has been deliberately killed by a drone . ? FOLLOW THE LEADER The fact remains that by using drones so much , Washington risks setting a troublesome precedent with regard to extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings . Zeke Johnson of Amnesty International contends that “ when the U . S . government violates international law , that sets a precedent and provides an excuse for the rest of the world to do the same . ” And it is alarming to think what leaders such as Syrian President Bashar al - Assad , who has used deadly force against peaceful pro - democracy demonstrators he has deemed terrorists , would do with drones of their own . Similarly , Iran could mockingly cite the U . S . precedent to justify sending drones after rebels in Syria . Even Brennan has conceded that the administration is “ establishing precedents that other nations may follow . ” Controlling the spread of drone technology will prove impossible ; that horse left the barn years ago . Drones are highly capable weapons that are easy to produce , and so there is no chance that Washington can stop other militaries from acquiring and using them . Nearly 90 other countries already have surveillance drones in their arsenals , and China is producing several inexpensive models for export . Armed drones are more difficult to produce and deploy , but they , too , will likely spread rapidly . Beijing even recently announced ( although later denied ) that it had considered sending a drone to Myanmar ( also called Burma ) to kill a wanted drug trafficker hiding there . The spread of drones cannot be stopped , but the United States can still influence how they are used . The coming proliferation means that Washington needs to set forth a clear policy now on extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings of terrorists — and stick to it . Fortunately , Obama has begun to discuss what constitutes a legitimate drone strike . But the definition remains murky , and this murkiness will undermine the president ’ s ability to denounce other countries ’ behavior should they start using drones or other means to hunt down enemies . By keeping its policy secret , Washington also makes it easier for critics to claim that the United States is wantonly slaughtering innocents . More transparency would make it harder for countries such as Pakistan to make outlandish claims about what the United States is doing . Drones actually protect many Pakistanis , and Washington should emphasize this fact . By being more open , the administration could also show that it carefully considers the law and the risks to civilians before ordering a strike . Washington needs to be especially open about its use of signature strikes . According to the Obama administration , signature strikes have eliminated not only low - level al Qaeda and Taliban figures but also a surprising number of higher - level officials whose presence at the scenes of the strikes was unexpected . Signature strikes are in keeping with traditional military practice ; for the most part , U . S . soldiers have been trained to strike enemies at large , such as German soldiers or Vietcong guerrillas , and not specific individuals . The rise of unconventional warfare , however , has made this usual strategy more difficult because the battlefield is no longer clearly defined and enemies no longer wear identifiable uniforms , making combatants harder to distinguish from civilians . In the case of drones , where there is little on - the - ground knowledge of who is who , signature strikes raise legitimate concerns , especially because the Obama administration has not made clear what its rules and procedures for such strikes are . Washington should exercise particular care with regard to signature strikes because mistakes risk tarnishing the entire drone program . In the absence of other information , the argument that drones are wantonly killing innocents is gaining traction in the United States and abroad . More transparency could help calm these fears that Washington is acting recklessly . The U . S . government also needs to guard against another kind of danger : that the relative ease of using drones will make U . S . intervention abroad too common . The scholars Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun have argued that drones provide “ a way to avoid deploying troops or conducting an intensive bombing campaign ” and that this “ may encourage countries to act on just cause with an ease that is potentially worrisome . ” Although al Qaeda remains a threat , it has been substantially defanged since 9 / 11 , thanks to the destruction of its haven in Afghanistan and effective global police , intelligence , and drone campaigns against its cells . In addition , the U . S . government needs to remember that many of the world ’ s jihadist organizations are focused first and foremost on local regimes and that although the United States has an interest in helping its allies fight extremists , Washington cannot and should not directly involve itself in every fight . The Obama administration should spell out those cases in which the AUMF does not apply and recognize the risks of carrying out so - called goodwill kills on behalf of foreign governments . Helping French and Malian forces defeat jihadists in Mali by providing logistical support , for example , is smart policy , but sending U . S . drones there is not . In places where terrorists are actively plotting against the United States , however , drones give Washington the ability to limit its military commitments abroad while keeping Americans safe . Afghanistan , for example , could again become a Taliban - run haven for terrorists after U . S . forces depart next year . Drones can greatly reduce the risk of this happening . Hovering in the skies above , they can keep Taliban leaders on the run and hinder al Qaeda ’ s ability to plot another 9 / 11 .

Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration’s weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries’ capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid.NOBODY DOES IT BETTERThe Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders” and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers.Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and “avoid gathering in open areas.” Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.Critics of drone strikes often fail to take into account the fact that the alternatives are either too risky or unrealistic. To be sure, in an ideal world, militants would be captured alive, allowing authorities to question them and search their compounds for useful information. Raids, arrests, and interrogations can produce vital intelligence and can be less controversial than lethal operations. That is why they should be, and indeed already are, used in stable countries where the United States enjoys the support of the host government. But in war zones or unstable countries, such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, arresting militants is highly dangerous and, even if successful, often inefficient. In those three countries, the government exerts little or no control over remote areas, which means that it is highly dangerous to go after militants hiding out there. Worse yet, in Pakistan and Yemen, the governments have at times cooperated with militants. If the United States regularly sent in special operations forces to hunt down terrorists there, sympathetic officials could easily tip off the jihadists, likely leading to firefights, U.S. casualties, and possibly the deaths of the suspects and innocent civilians.Of course, it was a Navy SEAL team and not a drone strike that finally got bin Laden, but in many cases in which the United States needs to capture or eliminate an enemy, raids are too risky and costly. And even if a raid results in a successful capture, it begets another problem: what to do with the detainee. Prosecuting detainees in a federal or military court is difficult because often the intelligence against terrorists is inadmissible or using it risks jeopardizing sources and methods. And given the fact that the United States is trying to close, rather than expand, the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, it has become much harder to justify holding suspects indefinitely. It has become more politically palatable for the United States to kill rather than detain suspected terrorists.Furthermore, although a drone strike may violate the local state’s sovereignty, it does so to a lesser degree than would putting U.S. boots on the ground or conducting a large-scale air campaign. And compared with a 500-pound bomb dropped from an F-16, the grenadelike warheads carried by most drones create smaller, more precise blast zones that decrease the risk of unexpected structural damage and casualties. Even more important, drones, unlike traditional airplanes, can loiter above a target for hours, waiting for the ideal moment to strike and thus reducing the odds that civilians will be caught in the kill zone.Finally, using drones is also far less bloody than asking allies to hunt down terrorists on the United States’ behalf. The Pakistani and Yemeni militaries, for example, are known to regularly torture and execute detainees, and they often indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.Some critics of the drone program, such as Ben Emmerson, the UN’s special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, have questioned the lethal approach, arguing for more focus on the factors that might contribute to extremism and terrorism, such as poverty, unemployment, and authoritarianism. Such a strategy is appealing in principle, but it is far from clear how Washington could execute it. Individuals join anti-American terrorist groups for many reasons, ranging from outrage over U.S. support for Israel to anger at their own government’s cooperation with the United States. Some people simply join up because their neighbors are doing so. Slashing unemployment in Yemen, bringing democracy to Saudi Arabia, and building a functioning government in Somalia are laudable goals, but they are not politically or financially possible for the United States, and even if achieved, they still might not reduce the allure of jihad.In some cases, the most sensible alternative to carrying out drone strikes is to do nothing at all. At times, that is the right option: if militants abroad pose little threat or if the risk of killing civilians, delegitimizing allies, or establishing the wrong precedent is too high. But sometimes imminent and intolerable threats do arise and drone strikes are the best way to eliminate them.THE NUMBERS GAMEDespite the obvious benefits of using drones and the problems associated with the alternatives, numerous critics argue that drones still have too many disadvantages. First among them is an unacceptably high level of civilian casualties. Admittedly, drones have killed innocents. But the real debate is over how many and whether alternative approaches are any better. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that in 2011, drone strikes killed as many as 146 noncombatants, including as many as 9 children. Columbia Law School’s Human Rights Clinic also cites high numbers of civilian deaths, as does the Pakistani organization Pakistan Body Count. Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation oversees a database of drone casualties culled from U.S. sources and international media reports. He estimates that between 150 and 500 civilians have been killed by drones during Obama’s administration. U.S. officials, meanwhile, maintain that drone strikes have killed almost no civilians. In June 2011, John Brennan, then Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser, even contended that U.S. drone strikes had killed no civilians in the previous year. But these claims are based on the fact that the U.S. government assumes that all military-age males in the blast area of a drone strike are combatants— unless it can determine after the fact that they were innocent (and such intelligence gathering is not a priority).The United States has recently taken to launching “signature strikes,” which target not specific individuals but instead groups engaged in suspicious activities. This approach makes it even more difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians and verify body counts of each. Still, as one U.S. official told The New York Times last year, “Al Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization—innocent neighbors don’t hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border with guns and bombs.” Of course, not everyone accepts this reasoning. Zeeshan-ul-hassan Usmani, who runs Pakistan Body Count, says that “neither [the United States] nor Pakistan releases any detailed information about the victims . . . so [although the United States] likes to call everybody Taliban, I call everybody civilians.”The truth is that all the public numbers are unreliable. Who constitutes a civilian is often unclear; when trying to kill the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, for example, the United States also killed his doctor. The doctor was not targeting U.S. or allied forces, but he was aiding a known terrorist leader. In addition, most strikes are carried out in such remote locations that it is nearly impossible for independent sources to verify who was killed. In Pakistan, for example, the overwhelming majority of drone killings occur in tribal areas that lie outside the government’s control and are prohibitively dangerous for Westerners and independent local journalists to enter. Thus, although the New America Foundation has come under fire for relying heavily on unverifiable information provided by anonymous U.S. officials, reports from local Pakistani organizations, and the Western organizations that rely on them, are no better: their numbers are frequently doctored by the Pakistani government or by militant groups. After a strike in Pakistan, militants often cordon off the area, remove their dead, and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a body count themselves. The U.S. media often then draw on such faulty reporting to give the illusion of having used multiple sources. As a result, statistics on civilians killed by drones are often inflated. One of the few truly independent on-the-ground reporting efforts, conducted by the Associated Press last year, concluded that the strikes “are killing far fewer civilians than many in [Pakistan] are led to believe.”But even the most unfavorable estimates of drone casualties reveal that the ratio of civilian to militant deaths—about one to three, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism—is lower than it would be for other forms of strikes. Bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos, for example, pack a much more deadly payload. In December 2009, the United States fired Tomahawks at a suspected terrorist training camp in Yemen, and over 30 people were killed in the blast, most of them women and children. At the time, the Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones, but had this not been the case, a drone’s real-time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children, and the attack would have been aborted. Even if the strike had gone forward for some reason, the drone’s far smaller warhead would have killed fewer innocents. Civilian deaths are tragic and pose political problems. But the data show that drones are more discriminate than other types of force.FOREIGN FRIENDSIt is also telling that drones have earned the backing, albeit secret, of foreign governments. In order to maintain popular support, politicians in Pakistan and Yemen routinely rail against the U.S. drone campaign. In reality, however, the governments of both countries have supported it. During the Bush and Obama administrations, Pakistan has even periodically hosted U.S. drone facilities and has been told about strikes in advance. Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan until 2008, was not worried about the drone program’s negative publicity: “In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all the time,” he reportedly remarked. Yemen’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, also at times allowed drone strikes in his country and even covered for them by telling the public that they were conducted by the Yemeni air force. When the United States’ involvement was leaked in 2002, however, relations between the two countries soured. Still, Saleh later let the drone program resume in Yemen, and his replacement, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, has publicly praised drones, saying that “they pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error, if you know what target you’re aiming at.”As officials in both Pakistan and Yemen realize, U.S. drone strikes help their governments by targeting common enemies. A memo released by the antisecrecy website WikiLeaks revealed that Pakistan’s army chief, Ashfaq Parvez kayani, privately asked U.S. military leaders in 2008 for “continuous Predator coverage” over antigovernment militants, and the journalist Mark Mazzetti has reported that the United States has conducted “goodwill kills” against Pakistani militants who threatened Pakistan far more than the United States. Thus, in private, Pakistan supports the drone program. As then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told Anne Patterson, then the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, in 2008, “We’ll protest [against the drone program] in the National Assembly and then ignore it.”Still, Pakistan is reluctant to make its approval public. First of all, the country’s inability to fight terrorists on its own soil is a humiliation for Pakistan’s politically powerful armed forces and intelligence service. In addition, although drones kill some of the government’s enemies, they have also targeted pro-government groups that are hostile to the United States, such as the Haqqani network and the Taliban, which Pakistan has supported since its birth in the early 1990s. Even more important, the Pakistani public is vehemently opposed to U.S. drone strikes.A 2012 poll found that 74 percent of Pakistanis viewed the United States as their enemy, likely in part because of the ongoing drone campaign. Similarly, in Yemen, as the scholar Gregory Johnsen has pointed out, drone strikes can win the enmity of entire tribes. This has led critics to argue that the drone program is shortsighted: that it kills today’s enemies but creates tomorrow’s in the process.Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.THE HOME FRONTStill, public opposition is real, and there is growing concern about the drone strikes even in the United States. The program came under especially heavy criticism domestically in 2011, when Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico, was killed by a drone strike in Yemen. There is no question that Awlaki was dangerous. Adept at interspersing Islamist rhetoric with pop-culture references, Awlaki had been described as a “pied piper for Western ears”: one admirer was Nidal Malik Hasan, the U.S. Army officer who killed 13 U.S. soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, in 2009.The Obama administration claims that Awlaki was actively involved in plots against the United States and that the strike against him was legal under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which Congress passed three days after 9/11 and which gives the president broad authority to use force against terrorist groups linked to the 9/11 attacks. Yet with the war on terrorism almost 12 years old and bin Laden dead, critics, such as the Georgetown University law professor Rosa Brooks, have begun questioning whether the AUMF still justifies drone strikes today. As Brooks has argued, “Many of the groups now being identified as threats don’t fall clearly under the AUMF’s umbrella—and many don’t pose a significant danger to the United States.” As for the case of Awlaki, opponents of his killing have argued that he did not pose an imminent threat to the United States and that in keeping the evidence used to justify his assassination secret, the administration violated the constitutional guarantee of due process for U.S. citizens. As Ron Paul, then a Texas representative, pointed out during his presidential campaign, Awlaki was never charged with any crime. He added, “If the American people accept this blindly and casually, that we now have an accepted practice of the president assassinating people who he thinks are bad guys, I think it’s sad.”The administration contends that the discussions held within the executive branch and the extensive vetting of evidence constitute a form of due process. Meanwhile, as the legal scholar Benjamin Wittes has pointed out, both Congress and the federal courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the validity of the AUMF since 2001. The U.S. government argues that given how secretly terrorists operate, it is not always possible to use other means to stop an individual overseas from planning attacks on U.S. forces or allies. As a result, the imminence of a threat should be assessed based on the individual’s propensity for violence and the likelihood of being able to stop him in the future. Wittes compares the decision-making process to that used in hostage situations, when police are not required to ask a judge for authority to kill a hostage taker or refrain from taking a clear shot if they have one. Perhaps most important, the White House has claimed only a very limited right to conduct drone strikes against U.S. citizens. The administration has asserted the authority to kill only senior al Qaeda leaders who cannot be captured, not any American member of al Qaeda. Indeed, it appears that Awlaki is the only U.S. citizen who has been deliberately killed by a drone.?FOLLOW THE LEADERThe fact remains that by using drones so much, Washington risks setting a troublesome precedent with regard to extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings. Zeke Johnson of Amnesty International contends that “when the U.S. government violates international law, that sets a precedent and provides an excuse for the rest of the world to do the same.” And it is alarming to think what leaders such as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who has used deadly force against peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators he has deemed terrorists, would do with drones of their own. Similarly, Iran could mockingly cite the U.S. precedent to justify sending drones after rebels in Syria. Even Brennan has conceded that the administration is “establishing precedents that other nations may follow.”Controlling the spread of drone technology will prove impossible; that horse left the barn years ago. Drones are highly capable weapons that are easy to produce, and so there is no chance that Washington can stop other militaries from acquiring and using them. Nearly 90 other countries already have surveillance drones in their arsenals, and China is producing several inexpensive models for export. Armed drones are more difficult to produce and deploy, but they, too, will likely spread rapidly. Beijing even recently announced (although later denied) that it had considered sending a drone to Myanmar (also called Burma) to kill a wanted drug trafficker hiding there.The spread of drones cannot be stopped, but the United States can still influence how they are used. The coming proliferation means that Washington needs to set forth a clear policy now on extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings of terrorists—and stick to it. Fortunately, Obama has begun to discuss what constitutes a legitimate drone strike. But the definition remains murky, and this murkiness will undermine the president’s ability to denounce other countries’ behavior should they start using drones or other means to hunt down enemies. By keeping its policy secret, Washington also makes it easier for critics to claim that the United States is wantonly slaughtering innocents. More transparency would make it harder for countries such as Pakistan to make outlandish claims about what the United States is doing. Drones actually protect many Pakistanis, and Washington should emphasize this fact. By being more open, the administration could also show that it carefully considers the law and the risks to civilians before ordering a strike.Washington needs to be especially open about its use of signature strikes. According to the Obama administration, signature strikes have eliminated not only low-level al Qaeda and Taliban figures but also a surprising number of higher-level officials whose presence at the scenes of the strikes was unexpected. Signature strikes are in keeping with traditional military practice; for the most part, U.S. soldiers have been trained to strike enemies at large, such as German soldiers or Vietcong guerrillas, and not specific individuals. The rise of unconventional warfare, however, has made this usual strategy more difficult because the battlefield is no longer clearly defined and enemies no longer wear identifiable uniforms, making combatants harder to distinguish from civilians. In the case of drones, where there is little on-the-ground knowledge of who is who, signature strikes raise legitimate concerns, especially because the Obama administration has not made clear what its rules and procedures for such strikes are.Washington should exercise particular care with regard to signature strikes because mistakes risk tarnishing the entire drone program. In the absence of other information, the argument that drones are wantonly killing innocents is gaining traction in the United States and abroad. More transparency could help calm these fears that Washington is acting recklessly.The U.S. government also needs to guard against another kind of danger: that the relative ease of using drones will make U.S. intervention abroad too common. The scholars Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun have argued that drones provide “a way to avoid deploying troops or conducting an intensive bombing campaign” and that this “may encourage countries to act on just cause with an ease that is potentially worrisome.” Although al Qaeda remains a threat, it has been substantially defanged since 9/11, thanks to the destruction of its haven in Afghanistan and effective global police, intelligence, and drone campaigns against its cells. In addition, the U.S. government needs to remember that many of the world’s jihadist organizations are focused first and foremost on local regimes and that although the United States has an interest in helping its allies fight extremists, Washington cannot and should not directly involve itself in every fight. The Obama administration should spell out those cases in which the AUMF does not apply and recognize the risks of carrying out so-called goodwill kills on behalf of foreign governments. Helping French and Malian forces defeat jihadists in Mali by providing logistical support, for example, is smart policy, but sending U.S. drones there is not.In places where terrorists are actively plotting against the United States, however, drones give Washington the ability to limit its military commitments abroad while keeping Americans safe. Afghanistan, for example, could again become a Taliban-run haven for terrorists after U.S. forces depart next year. Drones can greatly reduce the risk of this happening. Hovering in the skies above, they can keep Taliban leaders on the run and hinder al Qaeda’s ability to plot another 9/11.

Barack Obama

United States

drones

they

his

administration

weapon

President

George W. Bush

drone

his

Obama

U.S

drones

their

leaders

terrorists

sanctuaries

Pakistan

Yemen

Somalia

drones

al Qaeda

American

groups

they

U.S

forces

civilian

Critics

They

drones

civilians

governments

publics

Americans

governments

drone

United States

terrorist

havens

parts

Pakistan

elsewhere

drones

areas

drone

here

countries

United States

Washington

its

drone

regimes

U.S

drone

opponents

it

drone

Washington

drone

United States

it

NOBODY

Obama

administration

drones

they

New America Foundation

Obama

White House

U.S

drones

al Qaeda

Taliban

jihadist

operatives

Pakistan

Yemen

leaders

al Qaeda

Taliban

figures

who

Osama bin Laden

his

aide

Atiyah Abd al-Rahman

who

drone

Waziristan

region

Pakistan

leaders

leaders

who

leaders

who

drones

terrorist

organizations

they

operatives

who

who

forgers

bomb

makers

recruiters

fundraisers

Drones

terrorists

recruits

drones

al Qaeda

Taliban

operatives

jihadists

Mali

militants

areas

Leaders

they

drone

group

recruits

Drones

al Qaeda

structures

group

leaders

leaders

Critics

drone

world

militants

authorities

them

their

compounds

countries

United States

government

zones

countries

Pakistan

Yemen

Somalia

militants

countries

government

areas

militants

there

Pakistan

Yemen

governments

militants

United States

forces

terrorists

there

officials

jihadists

U.S

suspects

civilians

Navy SEAL

team

drone

bin Laden

United States

enemy

detainee

detainees

military

court

terrorists

sources

United States

facility

Guantánamo Bay

Cuba

suspects

United States

terrorists

drone

state

U.S

bomb

warheads

drones

zones

drones

airplanes

civilians

zone

drones

allies

terrorists

United States

Pakistani

Yemeni

militaries

detainees

they

civilian

areas

groups

critics

drone

Ben Emmerson

UN

rapporteur

human

Washington

Individuals

American

groups

U.S.

Israel

their

government

United States

people

their

neighbors

Yemen

Saudi Arabia

government

Somalia

United States

drone

militants

civilians

allies

drone

them

NUMBERS

drones

critics

drones

them

civilian

drones

innocents

Bureau of Investigative Journalism

drone

noncombatants

children

Columbia Law School

Human Rights Clinic

civilian

Pakistani

organization

Pakistan Body Count

Peter Bergen

New America Foundation

drone

U.S

sources

media

He

civilians

drones

Obama

administration

U.S

officials

drone

civilians

John Brennan

Obama

adviser

U.S

drone

civilians

U.S

government

military

males

area

drone

combatants

it

they

United States

individuals

groups

combatants

civilians

each

U.S

official

New York Times

Al Qaeda

organization

neighbors

trucks

border

guns

bombs

everyone

Zeeshan-ul-hassan Usmani

who

Pakistan

United States

Pakistan

victims

United States

everybody

Taliban

I

everybody

civilians

Who

civilian

Pakistani

Taliban

leader

Baitullah Mehsud

United States

his

doctor

doctor

U.S

forces

he

terrorist

leader

locations

sources

who

Pakistan

drone

areas

that

government

Westerners

journalists

New America Foundation

U.S

officials

Pakistani

organizations

Western

organizations

that

them

their

Pakistani

government

groups

Pakistan

militants

area

their

dead

reporters

their

body

themselves

U.S.

media

civilians

drones

Associated Press

civilians

many

Pakistan

drone

civilian

militant

three

Bureau of Investigative Journalism

Tomahawk

missile

salvos

United States

Tomahawks

terrorist

camp

Yemen

people

most

them

women

children

Yemeni

regime

drones

drone

women

children

drone

warhead

innocents

Civilian

drones

force

FOREIGN FRIENDS

drones

governments

politicians

Pakistan

Yemen

U.S

drone

governments

countries

Bush

Obama

administrations

Pakistan

U.S

drone

facilities

Pervez Musharraf

president

Pakistan

drone

Pakistan

he

Yemen

president

Ali Abdullah Saleh

drone

his

country

public

Yemeni

air force

United States

countries

Saleh

drone

Yemen

his

replacement

Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi

drones

they

you

you

officials

Pakistan

Yemen

U.S

drone

their

governments

enemies

WikiLeaks

Pakistan

army

chief

Ashfaq Parvez kayani

U.S

military

leaders

militants

journalist

Mark Mazzetti

United States

Pakistani

militants

who

Pakistan

United States

Pakistan

drone

Minister

Yousaf Raza Gilani

Anne Patterson

U.S.

ambassador

Pakistan

We

drone

National Assembly

Pakistan

its

country

terrorists

its

own

soil

Pakistan

forces

service

drones

some

government

enemies

they

government

groups

that

United States

Haqqani network

Taliban

which

Pakistan

its

Pakistani

public

U.S

drone

percent

Pakistanis

United States

their

enemy

drone

Yemen

scholar

Gregory Johnsen

drone

tribes

critics

drone

enemies

drones

drones

drone

organizations

those

who

drone

those

who

Pakistanis

drones

militants

who

their

country

Pakistanis

Yemenis

they

institutions

drone

their

their

governments

drone

its

percent

Pakistanis

United States

drone

team

missile

United States

drone

United States

Anwar al-Awlaki

U.S.

citizen

New Mexico

drone

Yemen

Awlaki

Islamist

Awlaki

piper

Western

admirer

Nidal Malik Hasan

U.S

Army

officer

who

U.S

soldiers

Fort Hood

Texas

Obama

administration

Awlaki

United States

him

Congress

president

terrorist

groups

bin Laden

critics

Georgetown University

professor

Rosa Brooks

AUMF

drone

Brooks

Many

groups

AUMF

many

United States

Awlaki

opponents

his

he

United States

his

administration

U.S.

citizens

Ron Paul

Texas

representative

his

Awlaki

He

American

people

we

president

people

who

he

guys

I

administration

branch

scholar

Benjamin Wittes

Congress

courts

AUMF

U.S.

government

terrorists

individual

U.S

forces

allies

individual

him

Wittes

hostage

police

judge

hostage

taker

they

White House

drone

U.S.

citizens

administration

al Qaeda

leaders

who

American

member

al Qaeda

Awlaki

U.S.

citizen

who

drone

LEADER

drones

Washington

Zeke Johnson

Amnesty International

U.S.

government

rest

world

leaders

Syrian

President

Bashar al-Assad

who

demonstrators

he

terrorists

drones

their

Iran

U.S.

drones

rebels

Syria

Brennan

administration

nations

drone

barn

Drones

weapons

Washington

militaries

them

countries

drones

their

arsenals

China

models

drones

they

Beijing

it

drone

Myanmar

Burma

trafficker

there

drones

United States

they

Washington

terrorists

Obama

drone

president

countries

they

drones

enemies

its

Washington

critics

United States

innocents

countries

Pakistan

United States

Drones

Pakistanis

Washington

administration

it

civilians

Washington

its

Obama

administration

al Qaeda

Taliban

figures

officials

whose

military

U.S

soldiers

enemies

German

soldiers

Vietcong

guerrillas

individuals

enemies

combatants

civilians

drones

who

who

Obama

administration

its

Washington

drone

drones

innocents

United States

abroad

Washington

U.S.

government

drones

U.S.

scholars

Daniel Brunstetter

Megan Braun

drones

troops

countries

al Qaeda

it

its

haven

Afghanistan

global

police

drone

its

cells

U.S.

government

many

world

jihadist

organizations

regimes

United States

its

allies

extremists

Washington

itself

Obama

administration

AUMF

governments

French

Malian

forces

jihadists

Mali

U.S

drones

there

places

where

terrorists

United States

drones

Washington

its

military

Americans

Afghanistan

Taliban

haven

terrorists

U.S

forces

Drones

they

Taliban

leaders

al Qaeda

kill

civilians

killed

operatives

U.S

Pakistan

Yemen

killed

Pakistan

Atiyah Abd al-Rahman

killed

innocents

killed

noncombatants

children

strikes

drone

killed

civilians

killed

United States

doctor

kill

Baitullah Mehsud

killed

people

Yemen

fired

Tomahawks

United States

killed

officer

soldiers

Texas

killed

Yemen

Anwar al-Awlaki

train

recruits


' Pure Carnage ' Recalled at Boston Marathon Trial A survivor of the deadly 2013 Boston Marathon bombings Thursday described the moments after the attack as " pure carnage . " Race spectator Jeff Bauman , who lost both legs in the explosions near the finish line of the race , testified on the second day of the trial of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in a Boston courthouse . Bauman hobbled to the witness stand on prosthetic legs , then told the jury that he bumped into Tsarnaev ' s older brother Tamerlan along the race course moments before the blasts killed three people and injured another 264 . Defense lawyers sought Thursday to limit graphic testimony of the bombing victims , but Judge George O ' Toole ruled the jury should hear witness descriptions of the aftermath of the attack . Prosecutors allege the Tsarnaevs were trying to avenge U . S . wars in Muslim countries . By blaming the older brother , defense lawyers hope to convince the jury to not sentence Dzhokhar Tsarnaev to death . Dzhokhar Tsarnaev ' s lawyer , Judy Clarke , told the jury Wednesday the 21 - year - old native Chechen participated with Tamerlan in setting off the bombs , but said Tamerlan masterminded the plot and deeply influenced his brother to take part in it . Dzhokhar Tsarnaev inadvertently killed his brother , running over him with a car , as they attempted to elude police days after authorities had identified them as suspects in the bombings . In his testimony , Bauman said he thought Tamerlan looked " very suspicious . He was alone . . . was not watching the race . He was not having fun . " Bauman said he noticed an unattended bag that hid one of the two home - made pressure cooker bombs that defense attorneys acknowledge the Tsarnaev brothers detonated . After the blasts , Bauman , at the race to watch his future wife run , said , " I looked down and saw my legs . It was pure carnage . . . I could see my bones and flesh sticking out . " He later described Tamerlan Tsarnaev for authorities as they began to search for bombing suspects . Protester outside the John Joseph Moakley federal courthouse where trial for Boston Marathon bombing suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is being held , Boston , Massachusetts , March 5 , 2015 . ( CarolynPresutti / VOA ) Wednesday , jurors heard testimony from three other survivors of the bombing who were severely wounded in the attack — two of whom each lost a leg . " My bones were literally laying next to me on the sidewalk , " said 27 - year - old survivor Rebekah Gregory , who also suffered multiple shrapnel injuries to one of her arms . Tsarnaev has pleaded not guilty to the 30 counts against him , including the fatal shooting of a Massachusetts Institute of Technology police officer days after the bombings as the Tsarnaevs tried to flee . Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his late brother are ethnic Chechens who had lived in the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan and the volatile Dagestan region of Russia before coming to the U . S . with their parents and two sisters about a decade before the bombings . Some information for this report comes from AP , AFP and Reuters .

'Pure Carnage' Recalled at Boston Marathon TrialA survivor of the deadly 2013 Boston Marathon bombings Thursday described the moments after the attack as "pure carnage."Race spectator Jeff Bauman, who lost both legs in the explosions near the finish line of the race, testified on the second day of the trial of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in a Boston courthouse.Bauman hobbled to the witness stand on prosthetic legs, then told the jury that he bumped into Tsarnaev's older brother Tamerlan along the race course moments before the blasts killed three people and injured another 264.Defense lawyers sought Thursday to limit graphic testimony of the bombing victims, but Judge George O'Toole ruled the jury should hear witness descriptions of the aftermath of the attack.Prosecutors allege the Tsarnaevs were trying to avenge U.S. wars in Muslim countries. By blaming the older brother, defense lawyers hope to convince the jury to not sentence Dzhokhar Tsarnaev to death.Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's lawyer, Judy Clarke, told the jury Wednesday the 21-year-old native Chechen participated with Tamerlan in setting off the bombs, but said Tamerlan masterminded the plot and deeply influenced his brother to take part in it. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev inadvertently killed his brother, running over him with a car, as they attempted to elude police days after authorities had identified them as suspects in the bombings.In his testimony, Bauman said he thought Tamerlan looked "very suspicious. He was alone ... was not watching the race. He was not having fun."Bauman said he noticed an unattended bag that hid one of the two home-made pressure cooker bombs that defense attorneys acknowledge the Tsarnaev brothers detonated.After the blasts, Bauman, at the race to watch his future wife run, said, "I looked down and saw my legs. It was pure carnage ... I could see my bones and flesh sticking out."He later described Tamerlan Tsarnaev for authorities as they began to search for bombing suspects.Protester outside the John Joseph Moakley federal courthouse where trial for Boston Marathon bombing suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is being held, Boston, Massachusetts, March 5, 2015. (CarolynPresutti/VOA)Wednesday, jurors heard testimony from three other survivors of the bombing who were severely wounded in the attack — two of whom each lost a leg."My bones were literally laying next to me on the sidewalk," said 27-year-old survivor Rebekah Gregory, who also suffered multiple shrapnel injuries to one of her arms.Tsarnaev has pleaded not guilty to the 30 counts against him, including the fatal shooting of a Massachusetts Institute of Technology police officer days after the bombings as the Tsarnaevs tried to flee.Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his late brother are ethnic Chechens who had lived in the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan and the volatile Dagestan region of Russia before coming to the U.S. with their parents and two sisters about a decade before the bombings.Some information for this report comes from AP, AFP and Reuters.

authorities

they

his

wife

I

my

I

my

He

Tamerlan Tsarnaev

Tsarnaevs

officer

her

who

Rebekah Gregory

survivor

police

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

him

Tsarnaev

Tamerlan

authorities

them

they

police

Bauman

he

suspects

his

Boston

where

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

suspect

Protester

suspects

courthouse

John Joseph Moakley

Massachusetts

Boston

who

Kyrgyzstan

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

his

brother

Chechens

Dagestan

He

AFP

Reuters

Russia

U.S.

their

each

My

who

two

jurors

survivors

CarolynPresutti

VOA

me

sidewalk

Soviet

republic

George O'Toole

victims

lawyers

Tsarnaevs

Prosecutors

witness

jury

Muslim

U.S.

sisters

parents

Bauman

courthouse

jury

witness

Tsarnaev

he

Tamerlan

brother

people

course

jury

Chechen

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

lawyer

Judy Clarke

countries

brother

lawyers

jury

Bauman

brothers

Tsarnaev

attorneys

bombs

one

he

Bauman

He

survivor

Boston

Boston

who

line

spectator

Jeff Bauman

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

Boston

region

AP

car

him

bombs

Tamerlan

his

Tamerlan

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

brother

brother

his

home

bombings

Boston

described

survivor

lost

who

explosions

trial

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

courthouse

told

Bauman

jury

blasts

killed

people

injured

ruled

George O'Toole

jury

attack

allege

Prosecutors

Tsarnaevs

sentence

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

jury

convince

lawyers

jury

told

Judy Clarke

jury

Chechen

setting off

bombs

Tamerlan

Chechen

influenced

brother

Tamerlan

killed

brother

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

elude

identified

authorities

them

suspects

said

Bauman

Tamerlan

said

Bauman

detonated

one

brothers

acknowledge

attorneys

blasts

search

they

suspects

trial

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

Boston

wounded

who

injuries

who

bombings

flee

Tsarnaevs

coming

parents

sisters

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

brother

U.S.

bombings


Birmingham pub bombings : Lawyer renews call for inquests Published duration 14 November 2014 image copyright Getty Images image caption The two bombs went off 10 minutes apart in pubs a few yards from each other A lawyer for the family of one of the 21 people killed in the Birmingham pub bombings is calling for inquests to be held for the victims . There have been no inquests since two bombs exploded at the Mulberry Bush and the Tavern in the Town in November 1974 , which also injured 182 people . Human rights lawyer Kevin Winters said he will be writing to West Midlands Police and the relevant coroner . Inquests would allow access to certain material never before disclosed . Six men , later dubbed the Birmingham Six , were jailed in 1975 but their convictions were quashed in 1991 . Families of the victims have criticised police , accusing them of withholding information over the years and say 40 years on from the bombings they still do not have the answers they need . Calls for a fresh investigation into what happened were denied by West Midlands Police in April . Speaking exclusively to BBC Radio WM ahead of the 40th anniversary next week , Mr Winters , who has represented families of victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland , said inquests would have been put off because of legal proceedings against the Six but " uniquely we now know the wrong people were put behind bars . " image caption Twenty - one people were killed when bombs exploded at the Mulberry Bush and Tavern in the Town on 21 November 1974 Brother and sister Julie and Brian Hambleton , who lost their sister Maxine in the bombings , have been leading a campaign to try to find out more about what happened . Ms Hambleton , who met Mr Winters this week to ask him to represent them , said she does not understand why inquests have never been held , even after 1991 . " Why hasn ' t anyone stepped up before now and said anything ? , " Ms Hambleton said . image copyright ( C ) British Broadcasting Corporation image caption Julie Hambleton said she feels she has not been given the answers she needs about her sister ' s death As well as establishing inquest hearings , Mr Winters said he would be pursuing several others avenues of action . This may include action against authorities under European Human Rights legislation , looking at " serious issues " about the previous flawed West Midlands Police investigation and within that " the deliberate peddling of the view that they had caught the perpetrators " . image caption Human rights lawyer Kevin Winters has been asked to represent the Hambletons " There ' s an on - going duty on behalf of the authorities , and especially West Midlands Police , to actually get to the bottom of what happened , " Mr Winters said . " These families have received a very poor service in terms of justice and truth and closure - they ' ve got nothing near it at all . " He said the families also had no recourse to remedies available to those affected by the Troubles in Ireland . Inquests would provide families with access to certain " disclosure materials " that he said had been kept from them . " In my view , and our view , there is a basis for an inquest and we ' re now going to be writing to West Midlands Police and the relevant coronial services in England through our agencies in London to invite a new inquest . " In response , Chief Constable Chris Sims said : " Nothing would give me more satisfaction than to bring those responsible for this atrocity to justice . " However , we have found no new evidence that would assist us in bringing anyone to justice for the pub bombings . " It is always possible that brand new and significant information could become available to us . " Let me be clear - this case is not closed . "

Birmingham pub bombings: Lawyer renews call for inquests Published duration 14 November 2014image copyright Getty Images image caption The two bombs went off 10 minutes apart in pubs a few yards from each otherA lawyer for the family of one of the 21 people killed in the Birmingham pub bombings is calling for inquests to be held for the victims.There have been no inquests since two bombs exploded at the Mulberry Bush and the Tavern in the Town in November 1974, which also injured 182 people.Human rights lawyer Kevin Winters said he will be writing to West Midlands Police and the relevant coroner.Inquests would allow access to certain material never before disclosed.Six men, later dubbed the Birmingham Six, were jailed in 1975 but their convictions were quashed in 1991.Families of the victims have criticised police, accusing them of withholding information over the years and say 40 years on from the bombings they still do not have the answers they need.Calls for a fresh investigation into what happened were denied by West Midlands Police in April.Speaking exclusively to BBC Radio WM ahead of the 40th anniversary next week , Mr Winters, who has represented families of victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, said inquests would have been put off because of legal proceedings against the Six but "uniquely we now know the wrong people were put behind bars."image caption Twenty-one people were killed when bombs exploded at the Mulberry Bush and Tavern in the Town on 21 November 1974Brother and sister Julie and Brian Hambleton, who lost their sister Maxine in the bombings, have been leading a campaign to try to find out more about what happened.Ms Hambleton, who met Mr Winters this week to ask him to represent them, said she does not understand why inquests have never been held, even after 1991."Why hasn't anyone stepped up before now and said anything?," Ms Hambleton said.image copyright (C) British Broadcasting Corporation image caption Julie Hambleton said she feels she has not been given the answers she needs about her sister's deathAs well as establishing inquest hearings, Mr Winters said he would be pursuing several others avenues of action.This may include action against authorities under European Human Rights legislation, looking at "serious issues" about the previous flawed West Midlands Police investigation and within that "the deliberate peddling of the view that they had caught the perpetrators".image caption Human rights lawyer Kevin Winters has been asked to represent the Hambletons"There's an on-going duty on behalf of the authorities, and especially West Midlands Police, to actually get to the bottom of what happened," Mr Winters said."These families have received a very poor service in terms of justice and truth and closure - they've got nothing near it at all."He said the families also had no recourse to remedies available to those affected by the Troubles in Ireland.Inquests would provide families with access to certain "disclosure materials" that he said had been kept from them."In my view, and our view, there is a basis for an inquest and we're now going to be writing to West Midlands Police and the relevant coronial services in England through our agencies in London to invite a new inquest."In response, Chief Constable Chris Sims said: "Nothing would give me more satisfaction than to bring those responsible for this atrocity to justice."However, we have found no new evidence that would assist us in bringing anyone to justice for the pub bombings."It is always possible that brand new and significant information could become available to us."Let me be clear - this case is not closed."

Birmingham

pub

Lawyer

Getty Images

bombs

pubs

other

lawyer

family

one

people

Birmingham

pub

victims

bombs

Mulberry Bush

Tavern

Town

people

Human

lawyer

Kevin Winters

he

West Midlands Police

coroner

Birmingham Six,

their

Families

victims

police

them

they

they

West Midlands Police

BBC Radio WM

Winters

who

families

victims

Northern Ireland

Six

we

people

people

bombs

Mulberry Bush and Tavern

Town

Brother

sister

Julie

Brian Hambleton

who

their

sister

Maxine

Hambleton

who

Winters

him

them

she

anyone

Hambleton

British Broadcasting Corporation

Julie Hambleton

she

she

she

her

sister

Winters

he

authorities

European

West Midlands Police

they

perpetrators

Human

lawyer

Kevin Winters

Hambletons

authorities

West Midlands Police

Winters

families

they

He

families

those

Ireland

families

he

them

my

our

we

West Midlands Police

coronial

services

England

our

agencies

London

Chris Sims

me

those

we

us

anyone

pub

us

me

Six men

exploded

bombs

Mulberry Bush

people

Tavern

jailed

Birmingham Six,

Six men

investigation

West Midlands Police

bombings

Maxine

hearings

Julie Hambleton

Winters


US Arrests Focus on Terrorism Fight NEW YORK — Disturbing allegations were contained in court papers describing the latest homegrown terror plot thwarted by the FBI and the New York Police Department . Noelle Velentzas and Asia Siddiqui were arrested at their Queens homes early Thursday following a sting operation using an undercover officer wearing a wire . The officer searching the homes recovered items including three gas tanks , a pressure cooker , fertilizer , jihadist literature and handwritten notes on the recipes for bomb making , court papers say . Velentzas had been " obsessed with pressure cookers since the Boston Marathon attacks in 2013 ' ' and made jokes alluding to explosives after receiving one as a gift , according to a criminal complaint citing one of the secret recordings made by the undercover agent who befriended the pair . Fighting ' homegrown violent extremists ' The women ’ s arrests show U . S . authorities “ are committed to doing everything in our ability to detect , disrupt and deter attacks by homegrown violent extremists , ' ' U . S . Attorney Loretta Lynch said in a statement . “ As alleged , the defendants in this case carefully studied how to construct an explosive device to launch an attack on the homeland . ' ' In this courtroom sketch , Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh , with beard , appears in federal court in New York April 2 , 2015 . Authorities say he planned to kill American soldiers . Their arrests came the same day as another U . S . citizen was brought from Pakistan to New York to face charges he supported a conspiracy to kill Americans . Texas - born Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh appeared Thursday in Brooklyn federal court and was held without bail . The women also were held without bail after a brief court appearance , where they spoke only to say they understood the charges against them . Velentzas , 28 , wore a hijab and a dark dress , and Siddiqui , 31 , had on a green T - shirt with a long - sleeved black shirt underneath and a dark long skirt . Siddiqui ’ s lawyer , Thomas Dunn , said his client " will enter a plea of not guilty , if and when there is an indictment . " Velentzas ' attorney had no comment . The complaint cites a poem written by Siddiqui that appeared in a magazine published by al - Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula . It declared there is " no excuse to sit back and wait for the skies [ to ] rain martyrdom , ' ' investigators wrote in court papers . Velentzas called al - Qaida ’ s founder , the late Osama bin Laden , one of her heroes , and said she and Siddiqui were " citizens of the Islamic State , " investigators said . Research methods According to the complaint , the women " researched and acquired some of the components of a car bomb , like the one used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing ; a fertilizer bomb , like the one used in the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City ; and a pressure cooker bomb , like the one used in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing , ' ' authorities wrote . After two New York City police officers were gunned down in a patrol car in December , Velentzas told the undercover officer that the deaths showed it was easy to kill a police officer , the complaint said . After the undercover officer mentioned that 25 , 000 officers had turned out for the first of the funerals for the two officers , Velentzas “ complimented ' ' the officer for coming up with an attractive target and considered whether the other funeral was an appropriate target , it added . The complaints suggests that authorities decided to make the arrests after Siddiqui came into “ possession of multiple propane gas tanks , as well as instructions for how to transform propane tanks into explosive devices , ” and told the undercover she was “ disinclined ” to talk about her plans . “ It is very , very important to note : There was never any imminent threat to our fellow New Yorkers , ' ' Mayor Bill de Blasio said when asked about the case . The plot , he added , " was undercut before it could turn into something dangerous . ' ' Siddiqui ’ s neighbors said she and her brother lived in the basement of a red - brick three floor house owned by their parents , who didn ' t live there . “ She was quiet , and I never thought she could do this , ' ' said Mohammad Shahidul Haque , a retired hospital lab tech . Other plot reportedly hatched in Canada As for Al Farekh , he and two other co - conspirators were students at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg , Canada , in 2007 when authorities say they started watching al - Qaida propaganda and hatching a plan to become martyrs abroad , an FBI agent wrote in a January complaint . Al Farekh and the two others flew to Karachi , Pakistan , on round - trip tickets in March 2007 after selling their belongings , disconnecting their phones and buying mountain boots that authorities say are commonly worn by al - Qaida fighters in Pakistan and Afghanistan , the complaint says . His lawyer did not comment . President Barack Obama has nominated Lynch to become the nation ’ s next attorney general , though her confirmation has been held up in the U . S . Senate .

US Arrests Focus on Terrorism FightNEW YORK — Disturbing allegations were contained in court papers describing the latest homegrown terror plot thwarted by the FBI and the New York Police Department.Noelle Velentzas and Asia Siddiqui were arrested at their Queens homes early Thursday following a sting operation using an undercover officer wearing a wire. The officer searching the homes recovered items including three gas tanks, a pressure cooker, fertilizer, jihadist literature and handwritten notes on the recipes for bomb making, court papers say.Velentzas had been "obsessed with pressure cookers since the Boston Marathon attacks in 2013'' and made jokes alluding to explosives after receiving one as a gift, according to a criminal complaint citing one of the secret recordings made by the undercover agent who befriended the pair.Fighting 'homegrown violent extremists'The women’s arrests show U.S. authorities “are committed to doing everything in our ability to detect, disrupt and deter attacks by homegrown violent extremists,'' U.S. Attorney Loretta Lynch said in a statement. “As alleged, the defendants in this case carefully studied how to construct an explosive device to launch an attack on the homeland.''In this courtroom sketch, Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh, with beard, appears in federal court in New York April 2, 2015. Authorities say he planned to kill American soldiers.Their arrests came the same day as another U.S. citizen was brought from Pakistan to New York to face charges he supported a conspiracy to kill Americans. Texas-born Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh appeared Thursday in Brooklyn federal court and was held without bail.The women also were held without bail after a brief court appearance, where they spoke only to say they understood the charges against them. Velentzas, 28, wore a hijab and a dark dress, and Siddiqui, 31, had on a green T-shirt with a long-sleeved black shirt underneath and a dark long skirt.Siddiqui’s lawyer, Thomas Dunn, said his client "will enter a plea of not guilty, if and when there is an indictment."Velentzas' attorney had no comment.The complaint cites a poem written by Siddiqui that appeared in a magazine published by al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. It declared there is "no excuse to sit back and wait for the skies [to] rain martyrdom,'' investigators wrote in court papers.Velentzas called al-Qaida’s founder, the late Osama bin Laden, one of her heroes, and said she and Siddiqui were "citizens of the Islamic State," investigators said.Research methodsAccording to the complaint, the women "researched and acquired some of the components of a car bomb, like the one used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; a fertilizer bomb, like the one used in the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City; and a pressure cooker bomb, like the one used in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing,'' authorities wrote.After two New York City police officers were gunned down in a patrol car in December, Velentzas told the undercover officer that the deaths showed it was easy to kill a police officer, the complaint said.After the undercover officer mentioned that 25,000 officers had turned out for the first of the funerals for the two officers, Velentzas “complimented'' the officer for coming up with an attractive target and considered whether the other funeral was an appropriate target, it added.The complaints suggests that authorities decided to make the arrests after Siddiqui came into “possession of multiple propane gas tanks, as well as instructions for how to transform propane tanks into explosive devices,” and told the undercover she was “disinclined” to talk about her plans.“It is very, very important to note: There was never any imminent threat to our fellow New Yorkers,'' Mayor Bill de Blasio said when asked about the case. The plot, he added, "was undercut before it could turn into something dangerous.''Siddiqui’s neighbors said she and her brother lived in the basement of a red-brick three floor house owned by their parents, who didn't live there.“She was quiet, and I never thought she could do this,'' said Mohammad Shahidul Haque, a retired hospital lab tech.Other plot reportedly hatched in Canada As for Al Farekh, he and two other co-conspirators were students at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada, in 2007 when authorities say they started watching al-Qaida propaganda and hatching a plan to become martyrs abroad, an FBI agent wrote in a January complaint.Al Farekh and the two others flew to Karachi, Pakistan, on round-trip tickets in March 2007 after selling their belongings, disconnecting their phones and buying mountain boots that authorities say are commonly worn by al-Qaida fighters in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the complaint says.His lawyer did not comment.President Barack Obama has nominated Lynch to become the nation’s next attorney general, though her confirmation has been held up in the U.S. Senate.

brother

Siddiqui

Osama bin Laden

one

al-Qaida

founder

investigators

Velentzas

al-Qaida

Arabian Peninsula

her

women

she

homes

officers

officers

he

Siddiqui

New Yorkers

her

neighbors

basement

house

al-Qaida

heroes

her

attorney

U.S. Senate

soldiers

American

he

Authorities

Pakistan

citizen

U.S.

Their

he

New York

her

our

al-Qaida

they

them

Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh

Brooklyn

officers

police

Velentzas

car

police

Lynch

nation

lawyer

Barack Obama

Afghanistan

His

fighters

Pakistan

authorities

homes

officer

officer

court

court

they

Americans

Texas

Attorney

car

investigators

State

Islamic

extremists

our

pair

agent

U.S.

it

authorities

Velentzas

officer

she

Siddiqui

devices

officer

She

women

explosives

Boston

Velentzas

court

bomb

jihadist

their

their

agent

FBI

martyrs

Pakistan

Karachi

others

Al Farekh

Loretta Lynch

defendants

U.S

courtroom

Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh

device

homeland

parents

their

there

I

she

World Trade Center

Oklahoma City

bomb

one

their

Queens

US

FBI

New York Police Department

Noelle Velentzas

Asia Siddiqui

who

Bill de Blasio

she

students

University of Manitoba

Winnipeg

Canada

Canada

Al Farekh

he

co-conspirators

authorities

they

federal court

New York

one

bomb

citizens

Siddiqui

officer

officer

Mohammad Shahidul Haque

NEW YORK

court

his

Thomas Dunn

Velentzas

client

Siddiqui

Velentzas

lawyer

Siddiqui

attorney

authorities

New York City

bomb

one

building

Boston

undercover

tech

hospital

criminal

one

women

extremists

authorities

pressure cookers

two

three

President

Arrests

US

arrested

Noelle Velentzas

Asia Siddiqui

attacks

Boston

pressure cookers

attacks

U.S

construct

device

attack

homeland

kill

Authorities

he

soldiers

kill

Americans

he

arrests

Their

charges

citizen

he

held

Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh

court

held

women

bombing

World Trade Center

bomb

bombing

building

Oklahoma City

bombing

Boston

gunned

officers

New York City

deaths

officer

kill

officer

arrests

authorities

Siddiqui

transform

devices

appears

Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh

courtroom

New York

federal court


Republican News · Thursday 6 December 2001 McGurk ' s bomb relatives call for inquiry BY LAURA FRIEL Calls for an inquiry accompanied the 30th anniversary commemoration of the 15 people who died and 16 who were seriously injured in the McGurk ' s bar bombing of 1971 . Relatives of the victims , who held a memorial service in Belfast this week , are calling for an investigation into allegations of crown force collusion in the UVF bomb attack . Thirty years ago this week , on 4 December 1971 , a UVF gang placed a bomb in the hallway of McGurk ' s bar in North Queens Street . Amongst the dead , which included children and pensioners , were several members of the bar owner , Patrick McGurk ' s family , who were upstairs in the living area at the time of the explosion . The building collapsed , trapping many of the victims under the rubble . Alex McLaughlin , whose father was killed in the attack , said there was a massive Crown force presence in the area in the week prior to the bombing in contrast to the night of the atttack . " Two days earlier , three men had escaped from Crumlin Road jail and the RUC had swamped the area looking for them , " said Alex . " It seems strange that loyalists would choose that time to drive from Tigers Bay into a Catholic area to plant a bomb . " Despite an eyewitness account identifying the bombing crew and the fact that the bombing was claimed by loyalists in the immediate aftrermath of the attack , the British authorities blamed the IRA . Journalists were briefed by senior members of the British Army , who claimed forensic evidence confirmed republicans were responsible for the explosion . In her study , " Ireland : the Propaganda War , " Liz Curtis describes how the British Army and RUC , with the assistance of much of the press , successfully diverted attention from the evidence of loyalist involvement and used the atrocity to discredit their principle enemy , the IRA . " The McGurk ' s bar bombing had caused more casualties than any single previous incident , " said Curtis , " loyalists were responsible but never stood publicly condemned for it beyond nationalist areas . " In 1978 , a self - confessed UVF member , Robert Campbell , was convicted of the bombing together with the 1976 sectarian killing of John Morrow , a workman mistaken for a Catholic . Pat Arthurs , who was 14 years of age when her mother was killed in the bombing , has described how the ' disinformation ' peddled by the RUC and British army left her confused and made it more difficult for her family to come to terms with the loss . Pat ' s father , who was also in McGurk ' s , survived the attack . In her heart , Pat always knew the bombing had been carried out by loyalists but there was always a doubt . And then there was the stigma . " I had to grow up with people saying that maybe my mother or father had something to do with the murder of 15 people , " said Pat . Mary Irvine , whose mother was killed in the bombing , said that while everyone else seemed to have forgotten about what happened , the people of the New Lodge Road and local community have supported relatives and survivors for thirty years . Mary particularly remembered the late Paddy McManus , a local Sinn Fein Councillor " who had kept the memory of what happened in McGurk ' s alive . " Almost a thousand people packed St . Patrick ' s Chapel on Donegall Street for a memorial mass this week . Following the service fifteen wreaths , one for each victim , were carried by relatives leading a silent candlelit procession to a new memorial at Great George ' s Street . At the site where so many had died , Fr David White condemned ' careless reporting ' which had added to the grief . " The bombing of Paddy McGurk ' s was a callous and cowardly sectarian act , " said Fr White , " and the enormous pain inflicted by the death of so many was intensified when the army and police personnel , together with the media , rushed to blame republicans . "

Republican News · Thursday 6 December 2001McGurk's bomb relatives call for inquiryBY LAURA FRIELCalls for an inquiry accompanied the 30th anniversary commemoration of the 15 people who died and 16 who were seriously injured in the McGurk's bar bombing of 1971. Relatives of the victims, who held a memorial service in Belfast this week, are calling for an investigation into allegations of crown force collusion in the UVF bomb attack.Thirty years ago this week, on 4 December 1971, a UVF gang placed a bomb in the hallway of McGurk's bar in North Queens Street. Amongst the dead, which included children and pensioners, were several members of the bar owner, Patrick McGurk's family, who were upstairs in the living area at the time of the explosion. The building collapsed, trapping many of the victims under the rubble.Alex McLaughlin, whose father was killed in the attack, said there was a massive Crown force presence in the area in the week prior to the bombing in contrast to the night of the atttack."Two days earlier, three men had escaped from Crumlin Road jail and the RUC had swamped the area looking for them," said Alex. "It seems strange that loyalists would choose that time to drive from Tigers Bay into a Catholic area to plant a bomb."Despite an eyewitness account identifying the bombing crew and the fact that the bombing was claimed by loyalists in the immediate aftrermath of the attack, the British authorities blamed the IRA.Journalists were briefed by senior members of the British Army, who claimed forensic evidence confirmed republicans were responsible for the explosion.In her study, "Ireland: the Propaganda War," Liz Curtis describes how the British Army and RUC, with the assistance of much of the press, successfully diverted attention from the evidence of loyalist involvement and used the atrocity to discredit their principle enemy, the IRA."The McGurk's bar bombing had caused more casualties than any single previous incident," said Curtis, "loyalists were responsible but never stood publicly condemned for it beyond nationalist areas."In 1978, a self-confessed UVF member, Robert Campbell, was convicted of the bombing together with the 1976 sectarian killing of John Morrow, a workman mistaken for a Catholic.Pat Arthurs, who was 14 years of age when her mother was killed in the bombing, has described how the 'disinformation' peddled by the RUC and British army left her confused and made it more difficult for her family to come to terms with the loss. Pat's father, who was also in McGurk's, survived the attack.In her heart, Pat always knew the bombing had been carried out by loyalists but there was always a doubt. And then there was the stigma. "I had to grow up with people saying that maybe my mother or father had something to do with the murder of 15 people," said Pat.Mary Irvine, whose mother was killed in the bombing, said that while everyone else seemed to have forgotten about what happened, the people of the New Lodge Road and local community have supported relatives and survivors for thirty years.Mary particularly remembered the late Paddy McManus, a local Sinn Fein Councillor "who had kept the memory of what happened in McGurk's alive."Almost a thousand people packed St. Patrick's Chapel on Donegall Street for a memorial mass this week. Following the service fifteen wreaths, one for each victim, were carried by relatives leading a silent candlelit procession to a new memorial at Great George's Street.At the site where so many had died, Fr David White condemned 'careless reporting' which had added to the grief."The bombing of Paddy McGurk's was a callous and cowardly sectarian act," said Fr White, "and the enormous pain inflicted by the death of so many was intensified when the army and police personnel, together with the media, rushed to blame republicans."

Republican News

McGurk

relatives

LAURA FRIEL

people

who

McGurk's bar

Relatives

victims

who

Belfast

crown force

UVF

bomb

UVF

gang

bomb

hallway

McGurk

's

bar

North Queens Street

dead

which

children

pensioners

members

bar

owner

Patrick McGurk

family

who

area

building

many

victims

Alex McLaughlin

whose

father

Crown force

area

men

Crumlin Road jail

RUC

area

them

Alex

loyalists

Tigers Bay

Catholic

area

bomb

eyewitness

crew

loyalists

British

authorities

IRA

Journalists

members

British

Army

who

republicans

her

Ireland

Liz Curtis

British Army

RUC

press

loyalist

their

enemy

IRA

McGurk

bar

Curtis

loyalists

areas

UVF

member

Robert Campbell

John Morrow

workman

Catholic

Pat Arthurs

who

her

mother

RUC

British

army

her

her

family

Pat

father

who

McGurk

her

Pat

loyalists

I

people

my

mother

father

people

Pat

Mary Irvine

whose

mother

everyone

else

people

New Lodge Road

community

relatives

survivors

Mary

Paddy McManus

Sinn Fein

Councillor

who

McGurk's

people

St. Patrick's Chapel

Donegall Street

victim

relatives

memorial

Great George's Street

site

many

David White

Paddy McGurk's

Fr White

many

army

police

personnel

media

republicans

died

people

injured

bombing

McGurk's bar

attack

bomb

investigation

collapsed

building

killed

father

attack

atttack

drive

Tigers Bay

area

loyalists

bomb

attack

loyalists

explosion

bombing

bar

casualties

convicted

Robert Campbell

killing

John Morrow

Robert Campbell

killed

mother

attack

killed

mother

bombing

died

many

bombing

Paddy McGurk's

death

many

explosion

bombing